Cross-System Interaction Failures
Don't Fail through the Cracks

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Fail through the Cracks: Cross-System Interaction Failures in Modern Cloud Systems

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The Dark Matter of Production Bugs! How bad are Cross-System Interactions? Out of 360 random issues, 120 issues were #CSI Failures!

Lilia Tang @liliatangxy will present paper @ #Eurosys2023! W/ @tianyin_xu @chaitybhandari @anna_karanika @jsy531

Paper: tinyurl.com/CSI-2023
Looks like an interesting paper. Honestly surprising if this number is as low as 30%.

It isn't a sample from production failures (we'd love to study but hard to find code-level details) The issues were sampled from JIRAs of OSS projects where majority are still bugs in one system. You seems to indicate x-system interaction failures are even more common in prod? 😐

That's my intuition. I don't have hard data on it, unfortunately, but I would roughly say that interaction issues are the majority (and not merely plurality) of in-production issues in large-scale dist sys.

Cool research, though. Looking forward to reading the whole paper.
Our production stack is mostly an orchestration of many (!) interacting systems.
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The production stack is mostly an orchestration of many (!) interacting systems.

“Site reliability” is determined not only by the reliability of individual systems, but also by the reliability of their interactions.
Interaction reliability is hard.

- Few formal description on cross-system interfaces
  - Not even “POSIX”

Spark

read(f)

assert(f.size() >= 0)

f is compressed
f.size() = -1

Job failure

SPARK-27239
Interaction reliability is hard.

- Few formal description on cross-system interfaces
  - No "POSIX" any more
  - No spec on error paths
Interaction reliability is hard.

- Few formal description on cross-system interfaces
  - No “POSIX” any more
  - No spec on error paths
- High cost of reasoning about multiple systems collectively
  - New tools are needed to cross system/program boundaries
  - Search space grows exponentially
Magnified by emerging computing paradigms

- Microservice
- Serverless
- Sky computing
- Hybrid cloud

From the Death Star to the Galaxy


Summary (from the paper)

• Individual systems become simpler and more fine-grained
  • More friendly for testing, analysis, and verification

• Cross-system interactions become more complex and error-prone
  • New tools and practices are needed

• Traditional reliability tools are insufficient
  • Many only reason about control- and data-flow within a program
What can be done about it?

• Testing and verification of systems with interactions
  • Find bugs manifested through interactions
  • Build formally verified systems with guaranteed safety and liveness
Kubernetes as a running (microservice) system

- ZooKeeper Controller
- RabbitMQ Controller
- FluentBit Controller
- Cassandra Controller
- Scheduler
- StatefulSet Controller
- Deployment Controller
- GC Controller
- API Server
- API Server
- API Server
- API Server

etcd etcd etcd
Kubernetes as a running (microservice) system
Kubernetes as a running (microservice) system

ZooKeeper Controller

RabbitMQ Controller

FluentBit Controller

Cassandra Controller

Scheduler

StatefulSet Controller

Deployment Controller

GC Controller

API Server

API Server

API Server

etcd

etcd

etcd
Kubernetes as a running (microservice) system
Controller and different types of interactions
Controller and different types of interactions

Controller

etcd

API Server

Controller

API Server

1

2

3
Interaction between controller and system state

Current

Cassandra
Controller

Desired

Reconciliation:
- Delete(container)
- ... Delete(volume)
- ...

Container
Volume
Unreliable interactions lead to disasters

Current

- Container
- Volume

Desired

- Container

Cassandra Controller

Delete(container)

Delete(volume)

Never executed

This bug was detected by our tool and has been fixed by the developers

Crash and Restart

Volume

Controller malfunction

Resource leak

Security issue

Never executed

Current Container

Desired Container

This bug was detected by our tool and has been fixed by the developers.
Sieve for automatic reliability testing

• Key Idea: Perturbing the controller’s interaction with the system state
  • **Usability:** Testing unmodified controllers
  • **Reproducibility:** Reproducing detected bugs reliably

• Detected **46** serious bugs in 10 popular Kubernetes controllers
  • **Severe consequences:** System outage, data loss, security issues, etc.
  • 35 confirmed and 22 fixed

• Available: [https://github.com/sieve-project/sieve](https://github.com/sieve-project/sieve)
Challenges of testing the interaction

Different implementations and diverse functionality

Non-crashing symptom

Sophisticated triggering condition
Perturb the controller’s interaction with the state

Reference run

Initial state

Desired state

System state: Objects in etcd

Every object creation/update/deletion advances the state

The interaction with the system state can be affected by many factors

Perturbed run

Common, transient faults
Flag buggy behavior with *differential* oracles

Reference run

Perturbed run

**Initial state**

**Desired state**

System state: Objects in `etcd`

**Differential oracles:**
Detecting liveness and safety violations without knowing the semantic of the system

Common, transient faults
Flag buggy behavior with *differential* oracles

**Reference run**

- **Initial state**
- **Desired state**

**System state:** Objects in *etcd*

**Perturbed run**

**Common, transient faults**

Liveness Property

A controller should *eventually* achieve the desired state

*Compare the end states*
Flag buggy behavior with *differential* oracles

Reference run

```plaintext
Initial state
```

Perturbed run

```plaintext
Desired state
```

System state: Objects in *etcd*

**Safety Property**

A controller should *never* delete user data unless requested

*Compare the state updates* (e.g., # volume deletions)

Common, transient faults
Exhaustive perturbation with different patterns

• Employ **three perturbation patterns**
  • Intermediate-state pattern
  • Stale-state pattern
  • Unobserved-state pattern

• **Exhaustively** test all bug-triggering perturbations
  • Systematically find all the targeted bugs
  • Inject faults with different timings

• Prune out ineffective perturbations to be **efficient**
  • Not every perturbation leads to bugs
The intermediate-state pattern

The interaction fails in the middle, leaving the controller to handle some intermediate state

Reference run

Intermediate state

Reference run

Perturbed run

Start a new reconcile cycle from S2

S1

S2

S3

S4

S5

{ Create(...) // S1->S2
  ...
  Crash
  Update(...) // S2->S3

Start a new reconcile cycle from S2

No atomicity guarantee!
The interaction is affected by staleness caused by asynchrony and caching.
The stale-state pattern

The interaction is affected by staleness caused by asynchrony and caching

Kubernetes is vulnerable to stale reads, violating ACID:

#59848

Open smarterclayton opened this issue on Feb 13, 2018 · 89 comments

smarterclayton commented on Feb 13, 2018 · edited

When we added resourceVersion=0 to reflectors, we didn’t properly reason about its interaction with stateful sets. This can cause two nodes to run a pod with the same name at the same time when using multiple API servers. This is a race condition because a read serviced by the watch cache can result in a stale pod (i.e., it connects to that API server can read an arbitrarily old history. We explicitly use quorum set reconciliation and stale state pattern

Scenario:

1. T1: StatefulSet controller creates pod-0 (uid 1) which is scheduled to node-1
2. T2: pod-0 is deleted as part of a rolling upgrade
3. node-1 sees that pod-0 is deleted and cleans it up, then deletes the pod in the API cache (i.e., the controller might have a cached pod-0)
4. The StatefulSet controller creates a second pod pod-0 (uid 2) which is assigned to node-2
5. node-2 sees that pod-0 has been scheduled to it and starts pod-0
6. The kubelet on node-1 crashes and restarts, then performs an initial list of pods against an HA setup (more than one API server) that is partitioned from the master (watch cache returns a list of pods from before T2
7. node-1 fills its local cache with a list of pods from before T2
8. node-1 starts pod-0 (uid 1) and node-2 is already running pod-0 (uid 2).

Kubernetes stale reads, with Madhav Jivrajani

#218 February 9, 2024

Kubernetes stale reads, with Madhav Jivrajani

Hosts: Abdel Sghiour, Kaslin Fields

Madhav Jivrajani is an engineer at VMware, a tech lead in SIG Contributor Experience and a GitHub Admin for the Kubernetes project. He also contributes to the storage layer of Kubernetes, focusing on reliability and scalability.

In this episode we talked with Madhav about a recent post on social media about a very interesting stale reads issue in Kubernetes, and what the community is doing about it.

Do you have something cool to share? Some questions? Let us know:

- web: kubernetespodcast.com
- mail: kubernetespodcast@gmail.com
- twitter: @kubernetespod
The unobserved-state pattern

There are observability gaps in the interaction

Reference run

Perturbed run

S3 missed in the interaction
Sieve: Testing interaction with the system state

Input
- Kubernetes Controller
- Workloads (E2E tests)

1. Produce a reference run
2. Generate test plans
3. Produce a perturbed run for each test plan
4. Flag bugs with differential oracles

Output
Test results for each perturbation

Open source: https://github.com/sieve-project/sieve
Interaction between controller and application

- Controller reconfigures the managed applications
  - must respect application operation semantics
Interaction between controller and application

Modifying the current dynamic configuration

Modifying the configuration is done through the `reconfig` command. There are two modes of reconfiguration: incremental and non-incremental (bulk). The non-incremental simply specifies the new dynamic configuration of the system. The incremental specifies changes to the current configuration. The `reconfig` command returns the new configuration.

A few examples are: `ReconfigTest.java`, `ReconfigRecoveryTest.java` and `TestReconfigServer.cc`.

General

Removing servers: Any server can be removed, including the leader (although removing the leader will result in a short unavailability, see Figures 6 and 8 in the paper). The server will not be shut-down automatically. Instead, it becomes a "non-voting follower". This is somewhat similar to an observer in that its votes don't count towards the Quorum of votes necessary to commit operations. However, unlike a non-voting follower, an observer doesn't actually see any operation proposals and does not ACK them. Thus a non-voting follower has a more significant negative effect on system throughput compared to an observer. Non-voting follower mode should only be used as a temporary mode, before shutting the server down, or adding it as a follower or as an observer to the ensemble. We do not shut the server down automatically for two main reasons. The first reason is that we do not want all the clients connected to this server to be immediately disconnected, causing a flood of connection requests to other servers. Instead, it is better if each client decides when to migrate independently. The second reason is that removing a server may sometimes (rarely) be necessary in order to change it from "observer" to "participant" (this is explained in the section Additional comments).

Note that the new configuration should have some minimal number of participants in order to be considered legal. If the proposed change would leave the cluster with less than 2 participants and standalone mode is enabled (standaloneEnabled=true, see the section The standaloneEnabled flag), the reconf will not be processed (BadArgumentsException). If standalone mode is disabled (standaloneEnabled=false) then its legal to remain with 1 or more participants.

Adding servers: Before a reconfiguration is invoked, the administrator must make sure that a quorum (majority) of participants from the new configuration are already connected and synced with the current leader. To achieve this we need to connect a new joining server to the leader before it is officially part of the ensemble. This is done by starting the joining server using an initial list of servers which is technically not a legal configuration of the system but (a) contains the joiner, and (b) gives sufficient information to the joiner in order for it to find and connect to the current leader. We list a few different options of doing this safely.

1. Initial configuration of joiners is comprised of servers in the last committed configuration and one or more joiners, where **joiners are listed as observers**. For example, if servers D and E are added at the same time to (A, B, C) and server C is being removed, the initial configuration of D could be (A, B, C, D) or (A, B, C, D, E), where D and E are listed as observers. Similarly, the configuration of E could be (A, B, C, E) or (A, B, C, D, E), where D and E are listed as observers. **Note that listing the joiners as observers will not actually make them observers - it will only prevent them from accidentally forming a quorum with other joiners.** Instead, they will contact the servers in the current configuration and adopt the last committed configuration (A, B, C), where the joiners are absent. Configuration files of joiners are backed up and replaced automatically as this happens. After connecting to the current leader, Joiners become non-voting followers until the system is reconfigured and they are added to the ensemble (as participant or observer, as appropriate).

2. Initial configuration of each joiner is comprised of servers in the last committed configuration + the joiner itself, **listed as a participant**. For example, to add a new server D to a configuration consisting of servers (A, B, C), the administrator can start D using an initial configuration file consisting of servers (A, B, C, D). If both D and E are added at the same time to (A, B, C), the initial configuration of D could be (A, B, C, D) and the configuration of E could be (A, B, C, E). Similarly, if D is added and C is removed at the same time, the initial configuration of D could be (A, B, C, D). Never list more than one joiner as participant in the initial configuration (see warning below).

3. Whether listing the joiner as an observer or as participant, it is also fine not to list all the current configuration servers, as long as the current leader is in the list. For example, when adding D we could start D with a configuration file consisting of just (A, D) if A is the current leader. however this is more fragile since if A fails before D officially joins the ensemble, D doesn't know anyone else and therefore the administrator will have to intervene and restart D with another server list.

**Warning**

Never specify more than one joining server in the same initial configuration as participants. Currently, the joining servers don't know that they are joining an existing ensemble; if multiple Joiners are listed as participants they may form an independent quorum creating a split-brain situation such as processing operations independently from your main ensemble. It is OK to list multiple joiners as observers in an initial config.

Finally, note that once connected to the leader, a joiner adopts the last committed configuration, in which it is absent (the initial config of the joiner is backed up before being rewritten). If the joiner restarts in this state, it will not be able to boot since it is absent from its configuration file. In order to start it you'll once again have to specify an initial configuration.
Interaction between controller and application

- Controller reconfigures the managed applications
  - must respect application operation semantics

- Must reason about **end-to-end** operation correctness
  - Unit tests are deficient
Acto: a push-button E2E testing tool

• Testing the controller *together with* the managed applications
  • complement unit tests

• Checking **end-to-end** correctness properties
  • *always* reconciling the managed application to its desired states
  • *always* recovering the application from undesired or error states
  • *always* being resilient to operation errors

• Detected **56** serious bugs in **11** popular Kubernetes controllers
  • **42** confirmed and **30** fixed

• Available: [https://github.com/xlab-uiuc/acto](https://github.com/xlab-uiuc/acto)
Interaction bugs detected by Acto

Current State

Desired State

A bug detected by Acto in the Pravega's ZooKeeper operator

replicas: 2 # ←- 3

replicas: 3 # ←- 2

Fail to update ZK membership
Basic idea: exploring different transitions of states

• Modeling operations as state transitions
Basic idea: exploring different transitions of states

- Chaining state transitions into an operation sequence
Basic idea: exploring different transitions of states

• Checking error-state recovery
Basic idea: exploring different transitions of states

- Checking the level-triggering principle
Secret sauces

• Automatic generation of comprehensive desired-state declarations
  • cover different operation scenarios
  • cover all the fields of the operation interface

• Automatic test oracles for flagging undesired behavior
  • e.g., consistency and differential oracles

• Open source: https://github.com/xlab-uiuc/acto
Verification? All types of interactions matter.
Interaction between controllers

ZooKeeper Controller

etcd

Get(vol)

Update(vol, v1)

V1

V2
Interaction between controllers

ZooKeeper Controller

Get(vol)

Update(vol, v1)

etcd

Update(vol, v1)

Volume Controller

V1

VersionConflict

V2
Interaction between controllers

- **ZooKeeper Controller**
  - Update(vol, v1)
  - Get(vol)

- **etcd**
  - V1
  - Not Found

- **Garbage Collector**
  - Delete(vol)
Interaction between controllers

ZooKeeper Controller

Get(vol)

V1

Update(vol, v1)

V2

etcd

Delete(vol)

Garbage Collector
Anvil: building verified Kubernetes controllers

• A framework to help build practical and verified controllers
  • **Verified**: the controller implementation is formally verified
  • **Practical**: the verified controller can be deployed in any Kubernetes clusters

• We have built three Kubernetes controllers using Anvil
  • Controllers for managing ZooKeeper, RabbitMQ and FluentBit
  • Feature parity and competitive performance
Modeling three types of interactions

• Interactions between the controller and the system state
  • API server and etcd that serves/stores the system state

• Interactions between the controller and the managed application
  • The managed application (customized by developers)

• Interactions between controllers
  • Built-in controllers that interact with the target controller

• Asynchrony and failures (e.g., controller crash, network delay)
Eventually Stable Reconciliation (ESR)

• A formal correctness specification for controllers
  • Generally applicable to diverse controllers
  • Powerful enough to preclude a broad range of bugs

• Formula: \( \text{model} \models \forall d. \Box \text{desire}(d) \leadsto \Box \text{match}(d) \)

• “If at some point the desired state stops changing, then the system state will eventually match the desired state, and always match it from then”
Reasoning about one step at a time

• $P$: the precondition for the controller to take one step
• $Q$: the postcondition after the controller takes one step
• $Step_c$: one step of the controller
• $Step_{any}$: one step of any component (including the controller) in the cluster

\[
\{P\} Step_c \{Q\} \quad \{P\} Step_{any} \{P \lor Q\} \quad WeakFair(Step_c) \quad WF1 \text{ rule}
\]

\[
P \rightsquigarrow Q
\]

If volume exists with $v1$, eventually volume exists with $v2$
Combining steps together

Developers can build up the leads-to (⇝) chain in this way to prove that the controller eventually reaches the desired state step by step, regardless of all possible interactions.
Towards a truly reliable cloud infrastructure
It takes a village to do the research.

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Reference


